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1 Introduction
Governments in many developed countries have implemented income transfer policies
for families with children. The goals of these policies are to help cover the cost of children,
reduce child poverty and improve the long-term opportunities of children. There are two
potential channels through which additional income may inﬂuence children's outcomes. On
the one hand, an increase in income would allow families to buy more goods and services
(food, education, health, books or educational toys) and directly promote the development
of children (labelled the resources channel) (Becker, 1981). On the other hand, income
transfers may have an indirect impact by reducing stress and improving family relationships
and emotional well-being (labelled family process) (Duncan and Brooks-Gun, 1997).
The major challenge faced by researchers is how to distinguish the eﬀect of income from
the eﬀect of other factors that may be correlated with income. To address endogeneity, several
studies use policy reforms to attain an exogenous increase in family income. These studies
show that family beneﬁt programs have signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on children's test scores
and the mental and physical health of children and mothers (Milligan and Stabile, 2009,
2011 ; Dahl and Lochner, 2012 ; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014 ; Baughman and Duchovny,
2016). All of these programs are means-tested and/or conditional to employment (e.g., the
Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC] in the USA and the Working Families Tax Credit [WFTC]
in the UK).
Little is known, however, about universal child beneﬁts and their eﬀects on the well-being
of children and parents. Universal family beneﬁts are paid regardless of whether parents are
employed and regardless of their income. The eﬀects of universal beneﬁts on the well-being
of children and their parents might be expected to diﬀer from those of other redistribution
programs. Hener (2016) exploited a major reform of the German child beneﬁt system in
1996. He reports that unconditional family cash transfers decrease mothers' labour supply
but have no impact on mothers' life satisfaction. With regard to a substantial birth grant in
Australia, Gaitz and Schurer (2017) and Deutscher and Breunig (2018) found no evidence
that the program improved the well-being of children and parents. 1 González (2018) also
shows that the introduction of a universal family beneﬁt for all new mothers in Spain had
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on children's health but increased health care utilisation.
In this study, we examine the eﬀect of a universal child beneﬁt on the well-being of children
and parents in Canada. In July 2006, the federal government introduced the Universal Child
Care Beneﬁt (UCCB) for each child under the age of 6 years. The beneﬁt is $100 per month,
1. For children, the outcomes studied are test scores, learning measures, socio-emotional development, be-
havioural measures and physical health. For parents, outcomes are parenting style, parental health, household
environment and parental investment.
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or $1,200 annually. The goals of this program were to help cover the cost of children and
to provide ﬁnancial assistance to families with young children in their choice of childcare.
Schirle (2015) shows that the UCCB had a signiﬁcant negative impact on the labour supply
of married mothers. 2 Daley (2017) also reports that mental health and life satisfaction of
mothers improved after the UCCB. 3 In this study, we focus on the health and behaviours
of children and parents.
It is not clear, a priori, whether the additional income from UCCB will improve the well-
being of children and parents. On one hand, many studies report that income boosts the
development and health outcomes of children and improves parental health and behaviours
(Duncan and Brooks-Gun, 1997 ; Yeung et al., 2002 ; Cooper and Stewart, 2017). On the
other hand, income seems mainly to have a major impact on disadvantaged families, and
universal beneﬁts are not eﬀective in improving family well-being (Gaitz and Schurer, 2017 ;
Deutscher and Breuning, 2018).
Our study contributes to the literature and policy debate on child beneﬁts in three
important ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to provide an
empirical analysis of the impact of the UCCB on children's health and behaviours, as well as
on parents. Previous studies on this program focus on labour supply, family expenditures and
maternal mental health (Schirle, 2015 ; Koebel and Schirle, 2016 ; Daley, 2017). However, no
evidence exists on this reform's eﬀects on children's well-being and parent-child relationships,
which are of great interest to policymakers. Second, we evaluate whether the policy has
achieved its objective to improve the well-being of families. Large amounts of money are
allocated to the UCCB. 4 It is important to know whether the program can be justiﬁed as an
intervention for the entire population. Finally, we contribute to a small but growing literature
that seeks to investigate the eﬀects of universal child beneﬁts on family outcomes (Hener,
2016 ; Deutscher and Breuning, 2018 ; González, 2018). There are relatively few studies on
universal programs, in particular in North America where these programs are not as common
as in Europe (Baker, 2011 ; Schirle, 2015).
For our study, we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY)
2. Koebel and Schirle (2016) distinguish eﬀects on labour supply by the marital status of mothers and
show that the UCCB negatively aﬀected the labour supply of legally married mothers but not common-law
married mothers or never-married mothers. In contrast, the reform had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
labour supply of divorced mothers.
3. Daley (2017) uses Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) data to investigate the eﬀect of UCCB
on the mental health, stress and life satisfaction of mothers. The CCHS data only cover the Canadian
population aged 12 and older. Daley (2017) investigates the eﬀects of UCCB on lone and married mothers,
separately.
4. The UCCB program represents 4.5% of federal transfers individuals in 2013-14 (almost $2.8 billion).
It is one of the largest transfer programs administered by the Canadian government (Treasury Board of
Canada, 2013).
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and the Survey of Young Children (SYC), which constitute representative samples of the
Canadian population of children and families. To identify the impact of the UCCB, we use a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) model. The treatment group consists of children aged 5 or less
and their parents. By contrast, the control group consists of children aged 6 or more (with
no younger siblings) and their parents.
We ﬁnd no evidence that the UCCB improved child health and behaviours in aggregate.
This ﬁnding is strengthened by the observation that the UCCB did not aﬀect parental
health and behaviour, the potential channel via which the cash transfer could have aﬀected
children's outcomes. Finally, a modest but fragile beneﬁcial eﬀect is found for low-education
families and for girls.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the UCCB reform. Sections 3 and
4 present, respectively, the data set used and the methodology. Section 5 presents empirical
results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Universal Child Care Beneﬁt
The UCCB was introduced in July 2006 to provide ﬁnancial assistance to families with
young children in their choice of childcare. The beneﬁt is $100 per month, or $1,200 annually,
for each child under the age of 6. 5 The UCCB is universal and taxable for lower-income
parents in the case of couples and for the sole parent in the case of single-parent families.
The UCCB is subject to both federal and provincial/territorial income taxes.
It is rare for a family to be eligible for the UCCB and not receive it. According to the
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2009), 99% of eligible families received the UCCB.
Parents who received the Canada Child Tax Beneﬁt (a means-tested beneﬁt for low- and
middle-income families with children less than 18 years of age) were automatically enrolled
in the UCCB ; otherwise, families applied to the Canada Revenue Agency. The application
costs for the UCCB are very low, almost zero (see Schirle (2015) for more details). Families
receive UCCB within 80 calendar days, and payments may be retroactive for up to 11
months. Beneﬁts for a child are automatically interrupted the month following the child's
sixth birthday.
In January 2015, the UCCB was established as $160 per month ($1,920 per year) for each
child under the age of 6 and was extended to children aged 6 through 17 ($60 per month
or $720 per year). In July 2016, the UCCB was replaced by a new child beneﬁt program.
5. The purpose of this Act is to assist families by supporting their child-care choices through direct
ﬁnancial support to a maximum of $1,200 per year in respect of each of their children who have not attained
the age of six years(Universal Child Care Beneﬁt Act .S.C. 2006, c. 4, s. 168).
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However, these last two programs do not aﬀect our study because they are outside our range
of data.
3 Data
To estimate the eﬀects of the UCCB on family well-being, we use conﬁdential micro-data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) and the Survey of
Young Children (SYC). The NLSCY is a long-term, biennial survey designed to measure a
wide range of characteristics related to Canadian children's development and well-being. 6
Administered by Statistics Canada, this survey started in 1994-95 (Cycle 1) and ended in
2008-09 (Cycle 8). A cohort of approximately 2,000 children aged 0-11 years was selected
in the initial cycle and followed longitudinally through the entire survey. Then, in every
cycle, new cohorts of 0-1-year-olds were added and followed until ages 4-5. The SYC is a
cross-sectional survey of children aged 1-9 and was conducted in 2010-11. The SYC contains
many of the questions on child and family well-being from the NLSCY and therefore allows
us to have a longer view of the eﬀects of the policy. 7 In all of the analysis, we use the weights
provided by the NLSCY/SYC, which have been adjusted for nonresponse and post-stratiﬁed
by province, age and sex to ensure that the survey is nationally representative. 8 All outcomes
are reported by the person most knowledgeable of the child (almost always the mother).
The data allow us to have the age of the child (in months) at the time of the interview.
As such, we are able to determine whether the child is eligible for UCCB, with families
being eligible for UCCB beneﬁts if they have at least one child under the age of 6 and are
observed after July 2006. Table 1 shows the UCCB eligibility for children observed in the
NLSCY/SYC. The treated are children under 6 years old, and the untreated are children
aged 6 and over. For children aged 6 and over (and therefore no longer eligible for UCCB), we
only keep families with no children aged 0-5 to avoid any confounding eﬀects of the program.
Cycles 1 (1994-95) to 6 (2004-05) are the pre-reform periods, and cycles 7 (2006-07) to 9
(2010-11) are post-reform periods. 9 Table 1 also shows that some child age groups are not
6. The target population was restricted to Canada's ten provinces and excluded children living on Aborigi-
nal reserves and full-time members of the Canadian Armed Forces. These exclusions represent approximately
2% of the Canadian population.
7. See also the study by Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2017) that combines the NLSCY and SYC data to
study the long-term eﬀects of a universal childcare policy on Canadian children's outcomes.
8. To our knowledge, NLSCY and SYC are the only nationally representative data on Canadian children
from birth to adulthood (McEwen and Stewart, 2014).
9. The NLSCY surveys are conducted over several months. In general, they start in September of the
ﬁrst year of the two-year period and end in June of the second year (Statistics Canada, 2008). For example,
for cycle 6 (2004-05), data collection started on September 27, 2004, and ended on June 24, 2005. For cycle
7 (2006-07), data collection started on September 1, 2006, and ended on July 31, 2007.
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observed in certain cycles. For example, children aged 8 and 9 years are not observed in
cycle 8 (2008-09). As a result, given the structure of NLSCY/SYC, we use as a control group
children aged 6-7 years. This control group allows the largest possible post-treatment period
(2006 to 2011) and is available over all years. Nevertheless, we assess the robustness of our
ﬁndings to this restriction in the empirical section. In our study, we excluded children under
12 months old because of the Canadian parental leave reform in 2001. 10 In addition, the
SYC data only cover families with children aged 1-9 years.
In addition, we restrict our sample to two-parent families living outside the province
of Quebec. The ﬁrst restriction is due to the various provincial and federal reforms that
have been implemented since 1998 and have aﬀected the labour force participation of single
mothers (Milligan and Stabile, 2007 ; Schirle, 2015). Indeed, Schirle (2015) reports that single
parents face diﬀerent constraints on ﬁnancial and time resources compared with two-parent
families and focuses on two-parent families. 11 Moreover, two-parent families remain a key
focus of the universal beneﬁts debate that aims to extend unconditional access to beneﬁts
to families to whom it was not previously made available (Bradshaw, 2012). The resulting
sample captures the vast majority of parents of young children. According to NLSCY/SYC
data, almost 85% of parents whose youngest child was aged less than 6 years were married
or living in common-law relationships.
The second restriction comes from the fact that, in the late 1990s, Quebec implemented
a universal childcare policy for all children aged 5 years or less at a cost at the time of only
$5 per day. This policy had a signiﬁcant impact on childcare use, maternal labour supply
and child and parental well-being (Baker et al., 2008 ; Haeck et al., 2015 ; Haeck et al., 2018).
During the same period, Quebec also implemented full-time kindergarten for all ﬁve-year-
olds and before- and after-school care for all school-age children (at a cost at the time of $5
per day). Finally, in January 2006, Quebec established its own Quebec Parental Insurance
Plan, which was more generous than the one oﬀered by the federal government.
We use the same health and behavioural measures that are used in the evaluation of family
policies in Canada and elsewhere (Baker et al., 2008 ; Kottelenberg et al., 2013 ; Haeck et
al., 2018). For children, we use the following ﬁve parent-reported measures : (1) the child
is in good/fair/poor health in general ; (2) hyperactivity/inattention score ; (3) emotional
10. In 2001, the federal government extended total available paid maternity leave from 25 to 50 weeks
across Canada. The studies by Schirle (2015), Koebel et al. (2016) and Daley (2017) include children aged
0 years in their main analysis of the eﬀects of the UCCB policy. As a robustness test, these authors exclude
families with children under 12 months old, and their results are similar. Baker and Milligan (2010, 2015)
also show that the Canadian parental leave reform had no impact on child behaviour, parenting practises or
maternal depression score, measured at ages 7-24 months and ages 4-5 years.
11. Koebel et al. (2016) and Daley (2017) also distinguish between one-parent families and two-parent
families to evaluate the eﬀects of UCCB.
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disorder and anxiety score ; (4) physical aggression score ; and (5) indirect aggression score.
The behavioural measures are available only for children aged 4-11. 12 For parents, several
parent-reported measures are also available : (1) the mother is in good/fair/poor health in
general ; (2) the mother's depression score (ranging from 0 to 36) ; (3) the family dysfunction
index (score ranging from 0 to 36) ; (4) the hostile/ineﬀective parenting score (ranging from
0 to 25) ; and (5) the consistent parenting score (ranging from 0 to 20). These measures are
available for all parents, except for the hostile and consistent parenting scores, which are
available for parents with children aged 2 to 11 years. For each of the child and parental
scores, a higher score indicates an increased level of health/behavioural disorder, except for
the consistent parenting score, for which the opposite is true. 13 Appendix Table A.1 reports
the sub-questions used for each measure. 14
Several control variables are available using the NLSCY/SYC. We use the sex of the child,
the mother's and father's highest level of education (less than a high school diploma, high
school diploma, some post-secondary education, post-secondary diploma), the age group of
the mother and father at the child's birth (14-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35 years or more), a dummy
for whether the mother or father is an immigrant, the size of the area of residence (ﬁve
groups, from rural population to 500,000 residents or more), the presence of older children
(no older child, one older child, two or more older children), the presence of younger children
(no younger child, one younger child, two or more younger children), the presence of children
of the same age and dummies for the age of the child. Appendix Table A.2 compares mothers,
fathers and family characteristics among children in the treated and control groups, before
and after policy implementation. We computed the pre-post diﬀerence for each group and,
ﬁnally, tested the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between treated and control groups (p-
values of the chi-square test of the diﬀerence). Taken together, we found that the parent
and family characteristics are balanced between the diﬀerent groups, except for maternal
post-secondary degree, age of the father at birth (14-24 ; 30-34) and the presence of at least
two older siblings. Later, in our analysis, we report ﬁndings with and without the control
variables.
12. In NLSCY/SYC data, children's behavioural measures vary by age group. Behavioural measures exist
for children aged 2-3 years but cannot be compared with those for children aged 4 and over.
13. Both the child and parental scales in NLSCY/SYC data are shown to have high levels of internal
consistency (Jenkins et al., 2003 ; Statistics Canada, 2010).
14. In NLSCY/SYC, there is no common cognitive measure for children under 6 and children aged 6 and
over. Therefore we focus on health and behaviour measures.
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4 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the eﬀects of UCCB, we use a DD model. The treatment group includes
children under 6 and their parents, who are therefore eligible for UCCB. 15 The control group
includes children aged 6-7 years (with no younger siblings) and their parents (Table 1). Our
empirical strategy is comparable to that used by Schirle (2015), Koebel and Schirle (2016)
and Daley (2017) in estimating the impact of the UCCB on labour supply and maternal
mental health. 16 We estimate the following model :
Yit = α + θUnder6it +
9∑
t=1
γtDt + βUCCBit + φXit + it (1)
where Yit is the outcome of child/parent i in cycle t. Outcomes studied here are child/parent
health and behaviour. The term Under6it is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the
child is under 6 years old and 0 otherwise. The cycle dummies Dt capture aggregate eﬀects
common to all children in Canada. The UCCB variable is an interaction term indicating
that the child is under 6 years old and is observed after the introduction of the UCCB. The
term Xit represents the control variables listed in section 3 and province ﬁxed eﬀects. it is
the error term.
Following Haeck, Lebihan and Merrigan (2018), we compute cluster-robust standard er-
rors based on birth-year cohort and province. Because we estimate impacts of the reform for
multiple outcomes simultaneously, we also adjust our p-values following Simes (1986). This
correction assumes that our outcomes are correlated with one another and avoids the pos-
sibility of over-rejecting the null hypothesis when using multiple correlated outcomes. The
likelihood of making Type I errors is therefore reduced. Our adjusted p-values are determined
by type of individual (child, parent), as suggested by Shaﬀer (1995). 17
The DD model relies on three critical assumptions. First, the common trend assumption
must hold before the policy is implemented ; in other words, in the absence of the reform,
mean outcomes of treated and control groups would have followed a similar trend. Figure 1
presents the evolution of a few outcome variables pre- and post-treatment. Clearly, the trends
between the two groups are similar during the pre-reform years. Later, in the robustness
15. As existing evidence on UCCB beneﬁts, we do not observe whether families actually received the
UCCB. Rather, we identify the treatment group based on eligibility (i.e., the presence of a child aged less
than 6 observed after July 2006). Schirle (2015) evaluates errors in deﬁning the treatment group based on
this criterion and reports that errors in assigning the UCCB occur in only 2.5% of two-parent families.
16. In their estimates, the treatment group included parents whose youngest child is aged 0-5. The control
group included parents whose youngest child is aged 6-17 in the Schirle (2015) and Koebel et al. (2016)
studies. In the Daley (2017) study, the control group consisted of mothers whose youngest child is aged
between 6 and 11.
17. These categories are speciﬁed in the regression tables.
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checks section, we will return to this point with a more formal test of the common trend
hypothesis.
Second, our approach assumes that there have been no other signiﬁcant changes in family
policies that aﬀected only children under the age of 6 (and their parents) over the period 1994-
2011. As previously discussed, we excluded children aged 0 years and the province of Quebec.
Other beneﬁts have been introduced during this period, but they apply to all children aged
17 and less (i.e., the Canada Child Tax Beneﬁt and the National Child Beneﬁt Supplement in
1993 and 1998, respectively ; the Child Disability Beneﬁt in 2006 ; and the Children's Fitness
Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit in 2007). 18 Schirle (2015), Koebel et al. (2016) and Daley
(2017) argue that such beneﬁts did not aﬀect families diﬀerently in terms of labour supply
and mental health. Similarly, except in Quebec, there were no widespread changes in the
availability and cost of childcare (Haeck, Lebihan and Merrigan, 2018). In the province of
Ontario, 19 the implementation of full-time kindergarten for four-and ﬁve-year-olds began in
2010 and was completed in 2014. The Ministry of Education of the Government of Ontario
(2013) reports that only approximately 15% of Ontario's four- and ﬁve-year-olds participated
in the program in September 2010 ; thus, a small proportion of children in Ontario is aﬀected.
However, robustness checks, discussed in the next section, will demonstrate that this reform
does not drive any of the results in this paper.
Third, the DD model requires that UCCB reform be exogenous. This assumption is likely
to hold because the UCCB was an exogenous cash transfer paid to all families with children
aged 0-5. This program is also unlikely to have had an impact on fertility (Milan, 2013 ;
Daley, 2017). Similarly, Schirle (2015), Koebel et al. (2016) and Daley (2017) argue that
UCCB is exogenous.
5 Econometric results
In this section we present the estimation results of the eﬀect of the UCCB on the well-
being of children and parents. We report the coeﬃcients and standard errors. Following Haeck
et al. (2018), estimated coeﬃcients that are statistically signiﬁcant according to adjusted p-
values are presented in boldface. 20 We also report a plus or minus sign for each outcome,
showing the direction the eﬀect must take for the UCCB to be beneﬁcial for families. 21 We
standardise all non-binary outcomes to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation (SD) of
18. See Schirle (2015) and Jones et al. (2015) for a discussion of family beneﬁts in Canada.
19. Ontario is Canada's most populous province, accounting for nearly 40% of the Canadian population.
20. The adjusted p-values are available on request.
21. See Haeck et al. (2018) and Lebihan et al. (2018) for using plus and minus signs to clarify the direction
of the eﬀect.
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1. Coeﬃcients can thus be interpreted in terms of changes in SDs.
5.1 Main Estimates
Table 2 presents the results for child and parents outcomes from the DD speciﬁcation. For
each dependent variable, we report the age of treated children, the range for the dependent
variable, the pre-programme mean (with standard deviation) for the treated group and the
number of observations. The last two columns present the estimates of our coeﬃcient of
interest, β, without and with controls. Interestingly, we observe that the coeﬃcients vary
little between the two speciﬁcations (without or with control variables). Subsequently, we
focus on the model with a full set of controls.
The estimation results presented in Panel A suggest that the UCCB had no signiﬁcant
impact on children's general health. For hyperactivity and emotional disorder scores, we
ﬁnd that the reform had a negative but statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect ; we estimate an
insigniﬁcant treatment eﬀect of 9.0% of an SD and 4.3% of an SD for hyperactivity and
emotional disorder scores, respectively. There is also no evidence of a change in physical
aggression score following the implementation of UCCB. However, the estimates suggest
that the indirect aggression score deteriorated for children less than 6 after the reform.
Indeed, we found a signiﬁcant increase of 12.7% of an SD for this measure. The results are
robust if we adjust the p-values for the multiple outcomes to reduce the likelihood of making
Type I errors (presented in boldface).
So far, our results indicate no beneﬁcial eﬀects of the UCCB on child health and be-
haviours. This conclusion would be strengthened further if the UCCB had no impact on
the channels through which transfers of income aﬀect children's outcomes. Previous empiri-
cal evidence identiﬁed various causal channels, such as monetary investments in the child,
parental health and parenting practises. In Panel B, we test whether the UCCB aﬀected
parental health and behaviours using a DD estimation model. We ﬁnd no evidence that
the reform aﬀected the mother's general health (insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the odds of being in
good/fair/poor health of 1.1 percentage points). We also show that the UCCB decreased
maternal depression score by 2.5% of an SD, but this eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero. 22 The sign of the coeﬃcients indicates that the reform has beneﬁcially aﬀected family
dysfunction score and parenting. However, none of those eﬀects are signiﬁcant. Again, our
estimates are robust to adjusted p-values.
22. These results could seem surprising and contradictory compared with the study by Daley (2017).
Nevertheless, excluding Quebec, the author's results show that the positive eﬀect on mental health becomes
insigniﬁcant. Outcomes in CCHS data for mothers diﬀer from those studied here. Indeed, our paper focuses
on maternal general health, depression score and the mother-child relationship (in addition to studying
children's outcomes).
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To summarise, it appears that the UCCB had no signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the well-
being of children and parents.
5.2 Robustness checks
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on several assumptions. 23 In this section, we ﬁrst test
whether the common time trend assumption holds before the UCCB is implemented. Then we
use alternative control groups (children 6-9 years old and their parents [no younger siblings]).
Finally, we keep only NSLCY data and show that our results are similar whether including
or not including the SYC data (2010-11).
For DD methodology, the common trend assumption before the policy is implemented is
necessary. In section 4, we showed graphically that the trends between the two groups were
similar during the pre-reform years (Figure 1). We also formally tested this assumption by
replicating our analysis in periods before the reform was implemented (column 1 of Table
A3). None of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, giving support to the assumption that the trends
for the outcome variables between treated and control groups were parallel before the reform.
In column 2 of Table A3, we use children aged 6-9 years (with no younger siblings) as an
alternative control group. The post-reform cycles are cycles 7, 8 and 9 (Table 1). The results
for the estimated eﬀect of the UCCB are similar to the baseline estimates. We continue to
ﬁnd that the policy had no signiﬁcant impact on children under 6, except for the indirect
aggression score. In this speciﬁcation, given the structure of NLSCY/SYC, we had in cycle
8 only children 6-7 years old. To keep the same age categories throughout the analysis, as a
robustness test, we also excluded cycle 8 (cycles 7 and 9 are post-reform cycles) (Table 1).
Column 3 of Table A3 shows, in general, no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the reform on the well-being
of children and parents, except for indirect aggression score. We also report a signiﬁcant
decrease of 9.8% of an SD for the hyperactivity score, but this is not robust to adjusted
p-values.
To have a longer view of the policy, we added the SYC data to the NLSCY data. As
a reminder, the SYC contains exactly the same questions used by the NLSCY. However,
whether the results obtained are driven by the addition of SYC to the NLSCY data may be
questioned. This also accounts for parameters of Ontario's kindergarten reform beginning in
2010. In column 4 of Table A3, we excluded SYC data ; our ﬁndings remain similar to the
baseline estimates.
23. It is not possible to estimate triple-diﬀerence models using the NLSCY/SYC data due to missing data
for the age groups necessary for the estimation and because outcomes diﬀer by children's age group (Table
1). Moreover, the NLSCY/SYC data only contain families with children.
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5.3 Heterogeneous eﬀects
It may not be surprising that the unconditional boost to family income provided by the
UCCB had no discernible eﬀect across the population as a whole. Improvement outcomes
are more plausible for some sub-populations, such as disadvantaged households (Deutscher
et al., 2018 ; Milligan and Stabile, 2011). Similarly, the eﬀects of child beneﬁts might diﬀer
depending on the child's sex. Milligan and Stabile (2011) show that Canadian child beneﬁts
have stronger eﬀects on mental health outcomes for girls (measured by children's behavioural
and maternal depression scores). To test these assumptions, we report, in Table 3, results
for diﬀerent population subgroups. We divide our sample into two groups : (1) households
with mothers with a high school diploma or less (low education) and (2) households with
mothers with some post-secondary education or more (high education). We also divide our
main sample by the child's sex : boys versus girls.
In general, our results show no improvement in child and parent outcomes, no matter the
level of the mother's education (Table 3). For lower-education families, we found a signiﬁcant
increase of 25.7% of an SD for the consistent parenting score, but the eﬀects are insigniﬁcant
for other outcomes. For higher-education families, the eﬀects are also mostly insigniﬁcant,
but we report a signiﬁcant increase of 11.3% of an SD for the indirect aggression score. The
signiﬁcant results in Table 2 for the indirect aggression score for the full sample thus seem
to come from families with high education.
For results by child's sex, it is diﬃcult to draw a clear conclusion, though it seems that
girls beneﬁt most from the reform. Indeed, our estimates suggest that the hyperactivity score
decreases by 15.5% of an SD for girls (signiﬁcant at the 5% level and robust to adjusted p-
values). Some other point estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial for girls, but
they are signiﬁcant at the 10% level and not robust to adjusted p-values. For boys, we report
a decrease in the emotional disorder score by 14.1% of an SD but an increase in the indirect
aggression score by 14.2% of an SD. The eﬀects for boys are not robust to adjusted p-values.
In sum, our results suggest that the UCCB was not eﬀective in improving the health
and behaviours of children and parents in aggregate. A modest but fragile beneﬁcial eﬀect
is found for low-education families and for girls. We discuss the possible reasons for these
results in the next section.
5.4 Discussion
Several factors may explain the statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the UCCB on family
health and behaviours.
The ﬁrst explanation can be related to the fact that the UCCB is universal i.e., UCCB
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is non-means tested and not targeted toward the sub-populations that may see the highest
returns from additional income. Existing evidence indicates positive signiﬁcant eﬀects of the
EITC on child development and health as well as maternal health ; however, the EITC diﬀers
from the UCCB because it is targeted toward disadvantaged households (Dahl and Lochner,
2012 ; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014 ; Baughman and Duchovny, 2016). Similarly, Milligan and
Stabile (2011) ﬁnd that Canadian child beneﬁts mostly aﬀect lower-education families, and
some of their results become insigniﬁcant when Quebec is excluded. 24 The UCCB beneﬁts
are sizeable and represent approximately 12-18% of the annual cost of raising a child (Schirle,
2015). The beneﬁts are comparable in size to cash transfers in other countries that found
signiﬁcant eﬀects (Gaitz et al., 2017). However, it is not surprising that an unconditional
program leads to a null eﬀect on the well-being of families. This is conﬁrmed by evidence on
universal family beneﬁts that found no impact on child and parent well-being (Hener, 2016 ;
Gaitz and Schurer, 2017 ; Deutscher and Breunig, 2018 ; González, 2018).
Another possible explanation is that the UCCB has no impact on children's outcomes
and on the mechanisms (direct or indirect) through which additional income could inﬂuence
children's outcomes ("family process and resources channels). Indeed, Schirle (2015) shows
that the UCCB had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on total household consumption and expenditures,
health, education, childcare or reading expenditures. Here, we also show that the reform had
no impact on parents' health or their relationship with their child. It is then not surprising
to observe a lack of eﬀects on children's well-being. Our results are consistent with existing
evidence on the causal link between universal child beneﬁts, expenditures and family well-
being (González, 2013 ; Hener, 2016).
Although our results are consistent with existing evidence, there are some limitations in
our study design that deserve more attention in future research. For example, in NSLCY/SYC
data, we do not have common behavioural measures for children aged 3 and under and chil-
dren aged 6 years and older. It would also be interesting to know whether the UCCB had a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on children's cognitive scores. 25 However, we do not have data on common
cognitive scores for the two groups. 26
24. Quebec's family policy is in stark contrast to that of other Canadian provinces, particularly with
regard to child beneﬁts. For example, in 2009-10, the maximum child beneﬁts for a two-parent family with
two children amounted to $CA 3,249 in Quebec compared to $CA 0-2,200 in the other provinces.
25. Gaitz et al. (2017) and Deutscher et al. (2018) found no evidence that unconditional cash transfers in
Australia are eﬀective in boosting learning and cognitive scores.
26. In NLSCY/SYC data, we only have a Motor and Social Development score for children aged 0-3. For
children aged 4-5, three measures of cognitive development are available : Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-
Revised (PPVT-R) ; Number Knowledge Test and the "Who am I ? test. See Baker and Milligan (2010,
2015) for more details.
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6 Conclusion
We ﬁnd no evidence that the UCCB improved family health and behaviours in aggregate.
A modest but fragile beneﬁcial eﬀect is found for low-education families and for girls. Our
results are robust to several speciﬁcations. Moreover, they call into question whether univer-
sal child beneﬁts are an advisable policy tool. Some policy implications can be suggested.
Unconditional cash transfers given to the entire population seem ineﬀective in improving
child and parental well-being, at least for the outcomes studied here. Future policies need to
be revisited either by focusing directly on families for which the marginal return of income
on children outcomes is highest, or by investing ﬁnancial resources in another way that could
have a direct impact on family well-being, such as childcare (Currie, 2001).
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Figure 1  Mean values of measures for child and parental outcomes by child age: cycles 1-8
of the NLSCY and SYC
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Notes: Shows the trajectories for the mean of two outcomes (standardized) for children aged 1-5 years 
and children aged 6-7 years. Source is the NLSCY (wave 1-8) and the SYC (here labeled as wave 9).
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Table 2  Estimated eﬀects of the policy for child and parent outcomes
Dependent Variable Age Range Mean N UCCB UCCB
(treated) (s.d) (1) (2)
A. Child Behaviour and Health
Child in good/fair/poor health (-) 1-5 0/1 0.108 53,658 -0.017 -0.021
(0.311) (0.015) (0.017)
Hyperactivity/inattention (-) 4-5 0-14 3.902 22,783 -0.066 -0.090
(2.785) (0.049) (0.058)
Emotional disorder and anxiety (-) 4-5 0-14 1.796 22,854 -0.063 -0.043
(1.911) (0.063) (0.068)
Physical aggression (-) 4-5 0-12 1.550 22,833 0.057 0.016
(1.829) (0.038) (0.044)
Indirect aggression (-) 4-5 0-10 0.669 22,123 0.118** 0.127**
(1.216) (0.050) (0.050)
B. Parent Behaviour and Health
Mother in good/fair/poor health (-) 1-5 0/1 0.227 53,342 0.020 0.011
(0.419) (0.016) (0.017)
Mother's depression score (-) 1-5 0-36 4.254 52,416 0.004 -0.025
(4.742) (0.047) (0.042)
Family dysfunction index (-) 1-5 0-36 8.121 52,704 0.012 -0.027
(5.088) (0.040) (0.041)
Hostile parenting (-) 2-5 0-25 9.106 39,234 0.005 -0.026
(3.549) (0.053) (0.044)
Consistent parenting (+) 2-5 0-20 15.027 38,907 -0.001 0.041
(3.280) (0.052) (0.056)
Controls No Yes
Notes: For each dependent variable, we report the age of treated children, the range for the dependent variable,
the pre-program mean for the treated group (with standard deviation in parentheses), the number of observations
and the estimated policy eﬀects without and with controls. All scores are standardised, except for child/mother
health (binary outcome). We report a plus or minus sign for each outcome, showing the direction the eﬀect must
take for the policy to be beneﬁcial. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by province and by birth-year
cohort. Statistically signiﬁcant estimates according to the adjusted p-values are presented in bold.
***: signiﬁcant at 1% ; **: signiﬁcant at 5% ;*: signiﬁcant at 10%
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Table 3  Heterogeneous eﬀects of the policy
Low-educ. mothers High-educ. mothers Boys Girls
Dependent Variable UCCB N UCCB N UCCB N UCCB N
A. Child Behaviour and Health
Child in good/fair/poor health (-) -0.026 14,451 -0.017 39,207 -0.021 27,344 -0.021 26,314
(0.038) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024)
Hyperactivity/inattention (-) -0.057 6,043 -0.087 16,740 -0.011 11,648 -0.155** 11,135
(0.097) (0.065) (0.075) (0.064)
Emotional disorder and anxiety (-) 0.047 6,073 -0.064 16,781 -0.141* 11,677 0.050 11,177
(0.095) (0.074) (0.083) (0.085)
Physical aggression (-) 0.099 6,069 -0.002 16,764 0.043 11,664 -0.011 11,169
(0.111) (0.043) (0.070) (0.052)
Indirect aggression (-) 0.175 5,887 0.113** 16,236 0.142** 11,317 0.105 10,806
(0.114) (0.052) (0.065) (0.077)
B. Parent Behaviour and Health
Mother in good/fair/poor health (-) 0.057 14,356 0.001 38,986 -0.018 27,200 0.037 26,142
(0.050) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Mother's depression score (-) -0.077 14,040 -0.002 38,376 0.047 26,727 -0.107* 25,689
(0.088) (0.047) (0.058) (0.065)
Family dysfunction index (-) 0.077 14,149 -0.049 38,555 -0.001 26,876 -0.053 25,828
(0.113) (0.058) (0.054) (0.051)
Hostile parenting (-) -0.071 10,430 -0.005 28,804 0.053 20,066 -0.096* 19,168
(0.077) (0.052) (0.078) (0.057)
Consistent parenting (+) 0.257** 10,359 -0.036 28,548 0.004 19,900 0.085 19,007
(0.101) (0.066) (0.076) (0.068)
Notes: For each dependent variable, we report the estimated policy eﬀects for children whose mothers have a high school diploma or less
(low-education mothers) and for children whose mothers have some post-secondary education or more (high-education mothers). We also
show the results by the child's sex (boys versus girls). All scores are standardised, except for child/mother health (binary outcome). We
report a plus or minus sign for each outcome, showing the direction the eﬀect must take for the policy to be beneﬁcial. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by province and by birth-year cohort. Statistically signiﬁcant estimates according to the adjusted p-values are
presented in bold. Covariates are included in all regressions.
***: signiﬁcant at 1% ; **: signiﬁcant at 5% ;*: signiﬁcant at 10%
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Table A.3  Robustness Checks (Appendix)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Falsiﬁcation test Ages 6-9 Ages 6-9 bis Ages 6-7, SYC excluded
Dependent Variable Pre-reform N UCCB N UCCB N UCCB N
A. Child Behaviour and Health
Child in good/fair/poor health (-) -0.004 32,415 -0.008 64,775 -0.013 49,480 -0.004 47,731
(0.024) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Hyperactivity/inattention (-) -0.058 14,080 -0.047 30,834 -0.098** 23,155 -0.043 20,536
(0.098) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
Emotional disorder and anxiety (-) 0.071 14,106 -0.044 30,913 -0.066 23,226 -0.024 20,586
(0.098) (0.058) (0.063) (0.091)
Physical aggression (-) -0.079 14,099 0.026 30,889 0.003 23,203 0.021 20,562
(0.072) (0.035) (0.043) (0.040)
Indirect aggression (-) 0.039 13,647 0.175*** 29,867 0.202*** 22,376 0.105** 19,921
(0.089) (0.045) (0.046) (0.053)
B. Parent Behaviour and Health
Mother in good/fair/poor health (-) 0.022 32,235 0.002 64,354 -0.006 49,211 0.018 47,417
(0.029) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020)
Mother's depression score (-) 0.076 31,709 0.017 63,069 0.009 48,411 -0.021 46,575
(0.062) (0.039) (0.043) (0.036)
Family dysfunction index (-) -0.033 31,951 -0.015 63,478 0.009 48,706 0.007 46,886
(0.087) (0.034) (0.041) (0.043)
Hostile parenting (-) -0.079 24,064 0.019 48,921 0.014 36,954 -0.025 35,287
(0.056) (0.045) (0.053) (0.043)
Consistent parenting (+) 0.084 23,942 0.010 48,459 0.023 36,676 0.034 34,967
(0.141) (0.041) (0.049) (0.051)
Notes: In column (1), for each outcome, we only use the pre-treatment periods to test the common trend assumption. In column (2),
we use children aged 6-9 years (and no youngest child) as an alternative control group. The post-reform cycles are cycles 7, 8 and 9. In
column (3), children aged 6-9 years (and no youngest child) are the alternative control group, but we only keep the post-reform cycles with
the same age categories (cycles 7 and 9). In column (4), SYC data are excluded. All scores are standardised, except for child's/mother's
health (binary outcome). We report a plus or minus sign for each outcome, showing the direction the eﬀect must take for the policy
to be beneﬁcial. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by province and by birth-year cohort. Statistically signiﬁcant estimates
according to the adjusted p-values are presented in bold. Covariates are included in all regressions.
***: signiﬁcant at 1% ; **: signiﬁcant at 5% ;*: signiﬁcant at 10%
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